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Abstract: As the communication industry has connected distant 
corners of the globe using advances in network technology, 
intruders or attackers have also increased attacks on networking 
infrastructure commensurately. System administrators can attempt 
to prevent such attacks using intrusion detection tools and systems. 
There are many commercially available signature-based Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs). However, most IDSs lack the capability 
to detect novel or previously unknown attacks. A special type of 
IDSs, called Anomaly Detection Systems, develop models based on 
normal system or network behavior, with the goal of detecting both 
known and unknown attacks. Anomaly detection systems face 
many problems including high rate of false alarm, ability to work in 
online mode, and scalability. This paper presents a selective survey 
of incremental approaches for detecting anomaly in normal system 
or network traffic. The technological trends, open problems, and 
challenges over anomaly detection using incremental approach are 
also discussed. 
 
Keywords: Anomaly Detection, Incremental, Attack, 
Clustering. 
1. Introduction 
The Internet connects users and providers of information and 
media services from distant corners of the world. Due to 
widespread availability of advanced networking 
technologies, the threat from spammers, intruders or 
attackers, and criminal enterprises is also increasing. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and firewall 
technologies can prevent some of these threats. One study 
[1] estimates the number of intrusion attempts over the entire 
Internet to be in the order of 25 billion per day and 
increasing. McHugh [2] claims that attacks are becoming 
more sophisticated while they get more automated, and thus 
the skills needed to launch them are being reduced. 
There are two types of IDSs: signature-based and 
anomaly-based. Signature-based IDSs exploit signatures of 
known attacks. Such systems require frequent updates of 
signatures for known attacks and cannot detect unknown 
attacks or anomalies for which signatures are not stored in 
the database. In contrast, anomaly based IDSs are extremely 
effective in finding and preventing known as well as 
unknown or zero day attacks [3][54]. However, an anomaly 
detection system has many shortcomings such as high rate of 
false alarm, and the failure to scale up to gigabit speeds. 
The main task of an incremental method is to construct or 
model the pattern classes and use them for correct 
classification of the input pattern as either belonging to a 
certain previously observed class or not belonging to any of 
referred classes. However, in network anomaly detection, the 
incremental approach updates normal profiles dynamically 
based on changes in network traffic without fresh training 
using all data for attack detection. Based on existing profiles, 
it can take the decision to raise an attack if abrupt changes 
happen in normal system or network traffic. Thus, it is useful 
to detect anomalies from normal system or network traffic 
from existing signatures or profiles, using an incremental 
approach. That is, an incremental approach updates profiles 
or signatures dynamically incorporating new profiles as it 
encounters them. It does not need to load the whole database 
each time into the memory and learn fresh from beginning. 
In the last two decades, a good number of anomaly based 
intrusion detection approaches [3][4][5][55] have been 
developed, but a lot of them are general in nature, and thus 
quite simple. Due to the lack of papers that discuss various 
facets of incremental anomaly detection, we present a survey 
in a structured manner along with current research issues and 
challenges in this field. 
This paper reports a selective and comprehensive survey 
of incremental approaches for network anomaly detection. In 
Section 2, we introduce the basic problem formulation while 
Section 3 provides the idea of anomaly detection. A good 
number of incremental techniques and validity measures for 
anomaly detection are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 is 
dedicated to evaluation datasets, whereas Section 6 presents 
performance evaluation mechanisms. Section 7 discusses 
research issues and challenges and finally reports concluding 
remarks in Section 8. 
2. Problem Definition 
Intrusions or attacks can be detected based on the collection 
of information from a network or a host (normally, in and 
out traffic). This problem has been formulated in [6] from 
the pattern recognition view point. Incremental approaches 
are used to make the system faster in terms of training as 
well as testing of the instances. There are enormous 
problems in developing incremental techniques for network 
anomaly detection due to the dynamic updation of normal as 
well as attack profiles. We observe  that the main importance 
of incremental network anomaly detection lies in dynamic 
profile updation for both normal and attack, reduced memory 
utilization, faster and higher detection rate, and improved 
real time performance. To address all these issues, we 
present a comprehensive survey of incremental approaches 
for network anomaly detection. 
3. Preface to Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly detection refers to the important problem of 
finding non-conforming patterns or behaviors in live traffic 
data. These non-conforming patterns are often known as 
anomalies, outliers, discordant observations, exceptions, 
aberrations, surprises, peculiarities or contaminants in 
.
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different application domains. In practice, it is very difficult 
to precisely detect anomalies in network traffic or normal 
data. So, anomaly is an interesting pattern due to the effect 
of traffic or normal data while noise consists of non-
interesting patterns that hinder traffic data analysis. 
The central premise of anomaly detection is that intrusive 
activity is a subset of anomalous activity [3][7]. When there 
is an intruder who has no idea of the legitimate user’s 
activity patterns, the probability that the intruder’s activity is 
detected as anomalous should be high. Kumar and Stafford 
[4] suggest four possibilities in such a situation, each with a 
non-zero probability. 
 
• Intrusive but not anomalous: An IDS may fail to detect 
this type of activity since the activity is not anomalous. 
But, if the IDS detects such an activity, it may report it 
as a false negative because it falsely reports the absence 
of an intrusion when there is one. 
• Not intrusive but anomalous: If the activity is not 
intrusive, but it is anomalous, an IDS may report it as 
intrusive. These are called false positives because an 
intrusion detection system falsely reports intrusions. 
• Not intrusive and not anomalous: These are true 
negatives; the activity is not intrusive and should not be 
reported as intrusive. 
• Intrusive and anomalous: These are true positives; the 
activity is intrusive and much be reported as such. 
4. Existing Incremental Approaches for 
Network Anomaly Detection 
Recently, several papers have focused on modeling and 
analyzing anomaly based IDSs. Only a few of these present 
incremental approaches. Based on a comprehensive survey 
of published incremental anomaly detection approaches, we 
conclude that most approaches have high rate of false alarm, 
are non-scalable, and are not fit for deployment in high-
speed networks. Anomaly detection techniques can be of 
three types: supervised, semi-supervised and unsupervised. 
Apart from the architecture of an incremental ANIDS, some 
published papers in each of these three categories are 
discussed in the following in brief. 
4.1 Architecture of an Incremental ANIDS 
In this section, we present a generic architecture of an 
incremental anomaly based network intrusion detection 
system (ANIDS) in Figure 1. 
  4.1.1 Network Traffic Capture 
It is useful to analyze network traffic to detect attacks or 
anomalies. In a capture module, real network traffic is 
captured by using Libpcap [10] library, an open source C 
library offering an interface for capturing link-layer frames 
over a wide range of system architectures. It provides a high-
level common Application Programming Interface to the 
different packet capture frameworks of various operating 
systems. The offered abstraction layer allows programmers 
to rapidly develop highly portable applications. 
Libpcap defines a common standard format for files in 
which captured frames are stored, also known as the 
tcpdump format, currently a de facto standard used widely in 
public network traffic archives. Modern kernel-level capture 
frameworks on UNIX operating systems are mostly based on 
the BSD (or Berkeley) Packet Filter (BPF) [11][12]. The 
BPF is a software device that taps network interfaces, 
copying packets into kernel buffers and filtering out 
unwanted packets directly in interrupt context. Definitions of 
packets to be filtered can be written in a simple human 
readable format using Boolean operators and can be 
compiled into a pseudo-code to be passed to the BPF device 
driver by a system call. The pseudo-code is interpreted by 
the BPF Pseudo-Machine, a lightweight, high-performance, 
state machine specifically designed for packet filtering. 
Libpcap also allows programmers to write applications that 
transparently support a rich set of constructs to build detailed 
filtering expressions for most network protocols. A few 
Libpcap calls these Boolean expressions, which can read 
directly from user’s command line, compile into pseudo-
code and passed to the Berkeley Packet Filter. Libpcap and 
the BPF interact to allow network packet data to traverse 
several layers to finally be processed and transformed into in 
capture files (i.e., tcpdump format) or in samples for 
statistical analysis. 
   4.1.2 Preprocessor 
In order to evaluate an IDS, an unbiased intrusion dataset 
in a standard format is required. Generally, the live captured 
packet contains a lot of raw data; some of them may not be 
relevant in the context of an IDS. Therefore, filtrations of 
irrelevant parameters during captures as well as extraction of 
relevant features from the filtered data are important 
preprocessing functions of an IDS. Apart from these, data 
type conversion, normalization and discretization are also 
useful functions of this module depending on the anomaly 
detection mechanism used in the IDS. 
 
a) Feature Extraction: Feature extraction from  raw data is 
an important step for anomaly based network intrusion 
detection. The evaluation of any intrusion detection 
algorithm on real time network data is difficult, mainly due 
to the high cost of obtaining proper labeling of network 
connections. The extracted features are of four types 
[13][14] and are described below in brief. 
• Basic features: These can be derived from packet 
headers without inspecting the payload. For example, 
the following features are basic features: protocol type, 
service, flag, source bytes, destination bytes; 
•  Content based features: Domain knowledge is used to 
assess the payload of the original TCP (Transmission 
Control Protocol) packets. This type includes features 
such as the number of failed login attempts; 
• Time-based features: These features are designed to 
capture properties that mature over a 2-second temporal 
window. One example of such a feature is the number of 
connections to the same host over the 2-second interval; 
• Connection-based features: These features are computed 
over a historical window estimated over the number of 
connections, in this case 100, instead of time. 
 
These features are designed to assess attacks, which span 
intervals longer than 2 seconds. It is well known that features 
constructed from the data content of the connections are 
more important when detecting R2L (Remote to Local) and 
U2R (User to Root) attack types in KDD99 intrusion dataset 
[14], while time-based and connection based features are 
more important for detection of DoS (Denial of Service) and 
probing attack types [15]. 
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 Figure 1. A generic architecture of an Incremental ANIDS
 
b) Data Type Conversion: Both features and raw data 
may include numeric as well as categorical data (e.g., tcp, 
icmp (Internet Control Message Protocol), telnet, etc). 
Therefore, to apply a clustering anomaly detection 
technique based on a proximity measure for numeric or 
categorical data, it may be necessary to convert the data. 
 
c) Normalization: In an intrusion dataset, all parameters 
or field values may not be equally weighted. In such 
cases, normalization is considered useful before applying 
an anomaly detection mechanism. 
 
d) Discretization: The network intrusion data contains 
several continuous valued attributes such as number of 
packets, number of bytes, duration of each connection, 
etc. These attributes may need to be transformed into 
binary features before applying any standard association 
mining algorithms. The transformation can be performed 
using a variety of supervised and unsupervised 
discretization techniques. For example, using the output 
scores of the anomaly detector as its ground truth, MINDS 
(Minnesota INtrusion Detection System) [16] employs a 
supervised binning strategy to discretize attributes. 
Initially, all distinct values of a continuous attribute are 
put into one bin. The worst bin in terms of purity is 
selected for partitioning until the desired number of bins is 
reached. The discretization of numeric attributes 
contributes to the comprehension of the final results. 
4.1.3 Anomaly Detection Engine 
Anomaly detection is usually flexible and adaptive 
enough to detect novel attacks. There are still many 
problems in anomaly detection approaches. Some issues 
in anomaly detection are discussed below. 
 
a) Types of Anomalies: The purpose of anomaly 
detection is to find anomalies in various application 
domains. An anomalous MRI image may indicate 
presence of malignant tumors [17]. Anomalies in credit 
card transaction data may indicate credit card or identity 
theft [18]. Anomalous readings from a spacecraft sensor 
can signify a fault in some component of the spacecraft 
[19]. Detection of anomalies or outliers were discussed as 
early as in the 9th century [20]. Anomalies are classified 
into three categories based on [5]. 
 
• Point anomalies: An individual data instance may be 
anomalous with respect to the rest of the data. 
• Contextual anomalies: A data instance may be 
anomalous in a specific context with respect to a 
condition [21]. Two sets of attributes are normally 
used to detect this type of anomalies: (a) contextual 
attributes and (b) behavioral attributes. However, 
Song et al. [21] use the terms environmental and 
indicator attributes respectively against a context. 
Contextual attributes determine the context or 
neighborhood of an instance. Behavioral attributes 
are responsible for the non-contextual characteristics 
of an instance. In known point anomaly detection 
techniques, identifying a context and computing 
anomaly score for each test data instance are generic 
steps. 
 
    To detect these anomalies, Song et al. [21] propose a 
model which is based on contextual and behavioral 
attributes. The authors assume that the attributes are 
pre-partitioned. Each test data instance d is 
represented as (x, y). U is the contextual data 
instance, which is partitioned by using Gaussian 
Mixture Model (GMM). V is the behavioral data 
instance, which is also partitioned by using another 
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). P (Vj | Ui) is a 
mapping function indicates that the probability of the 
indicator part of data point y to be generated from Vj, 
whereas the environmental part x is generated by 
using Ui. Thus the anomaly score, ASd for a given test 
data instance d = (x, y) is given by- 
    ∑ ∑
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   where nU is the number of mixture components in U 
and nV is the number of mixture components in V. 
p(x∈Ui) is the probability of a sample point x to be 
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generated from the mixture component Ui while 
p(y∈   Vj) is the probability of a sample point y to be 
generated from the mixture component Vj. 
 
• Collective anomalies: Sometimes, it is not a single 
data point that is anomalous, but it is a collection of 
related data instances that is anomalous with respect 
to the entire dataset. It is worth mentioning that 
unlike point anomalies, detection of collective 
anomalies requires identifying related anomalous 
points in a dataset. To detect contextual anomalies, 
one needs to identify the appropriate contextual or 
behavioral attributes in the data. 
 
b) Data Labels: Labeling a data instance as normal or 
anomalous based on its behavior is often prohibitively 
expensive. A human expert often does labeling manually 
and hence it requires substantial effort to obtain the 
labeled training dataset. Typically, getting a labeled set of 
anomalous data instances covering all possible types of 
anomalous behavior is more difficult than getting labeled 
data for normal behavior. 
 
c) Reporting of anomalies: An important aspect for any 
anomaly detection technique is the way it reports 
anomalies. Typically, the outputs produced by anomaly 
detection techniques are one of the following two types. 
 
• Scores: An anomaly score is assigned to each 
instance in the test data depending on the degree to 
which that instance is considered an anomaly. 
Usually, the output of such a technique is a ranked 
list of anomalies. An analyst may choose to either 
analyze the top few anomalies or use a threshold to 
select anomalies for further investigation [22]. 
• Labels: A label (normal or anomalous) is assigned to 
each test instance. Scoring based anomaly detection 
techniques allow the analyst to use a domain specific 
threshold to select the most relevant anomalies. 
Generally, an IDS uses clustering techniques for 
grouping activities. It merely classifies the data, 
without any interpretation of the data. A classical 
labelling strategy is to measure the cardinality of the 
clusters, and label some percentage of the smallest 
clusters as malicious. This approach does, however, 
have some limitations, and does not detect massive 
attacks [23] properly, e.g. Denial-of-Service attacks. 
Dunn's index [24] or C-index [25] are well suited for 
clustering quality evaluation indices. A hallmark of 
good clustering quality is compact clusters distant 
from each other. Dunn's index (D) is defined as the 
ratio between the minimal intra-cluster distances dmin 
to maximal inter-cluster distance dmax, i.e., dmin / dmax. 
D is limited to the interval [0, 1] and should be 
maximized for good clustering. On the other hand, C-
index (C) is defined in terms S, i.e., the sum of 
distances over all pairs of objects in the same cluster. 
Let n be the number of such object pairs, and Smin be 
the sum of the n smallest distances if all pairs of 
objects are considered. Likewise, let Smax be the sum 
of the n largest distances out of all pairs. Then C is 
computed as (S - Smin) / (S - Smax). C is restricted to the 
interval [0, 1] as well and should be minimized for 
good clustering. D measures only two distances 
whereas C requires clusters of equal cardinality to 
produce proper quality evaluations. 
 
d) Matching: Matching is the most important functional 
module in the incremental anomaly based intrusion 
detection architecture. Generally, it can be done either, by 
using a distance based approach, or, by a density based 
approach, or by a combination of the both. In a distance 
based approach, the proximity measure plays a vital role 
as in classification, clustering, and information retrieval. 
From scientific and mathematical points of view, distance 
is defined as a quantitative degree of how far apart two 
objects are [26]. A synonym for distance is dissimilarity. 
Distance measures satisfying metric properties are simply 
called metric while other non-metric distance measures 
are occasionally called divergence. A synonym for 
similarity is proximity. Similarity measures are often 
called similarity coefficients. The choice of distance or 
similarity measures depends on the measurement type for 
the object's attributes or the representation of objects. 
However, proximity-based approaches typically take 
O(n2) matching time. On the other hand, a density based 
approach attempts to match by using the nearest 
neighbour concept. It is closely related to the proximity 
based approach since density is defined in terms of 
proximity. One common approach is to define density as 
the reciprocal of the average distance to the k-nearest 
neighbours [27]. If the distance is small, the density is 
high, and vice versa. Anomalies in the test data are 
usually found in the low density areas. If the density is 
high, the occurrence of anomalies is low and vice versa. 
However, it takes O(n2) time for matching. It can be 
reduce up to O(nlogn) by using appropriate data 
structures. 
4.1.4 Rule, Profile or Signature 
In misuse based intrusion detection, rules, profiles or 
signatures play a very important role. It is generated based 
on true normal data or on existing or known attack data. 
However, updation of such a rule or profile or signature 
base dynamically is very essential to cope with evolving 
network scenarios. But due to the lack of availability of 
exhaustive true normal data, generating of an effective 
rule-base or set of profiles is still a challenging task. 
4.1.5 Security Manager 
In this phase, the security manger handles the rule, 
profile or signature base to update dynamically based on 
the feedback obtained from the arrival of new type of 
normal data or on the detection of new type of attacks. We 
introduce post processing of alarms to reduce the number 
of false positives. 
4.1.6 Alarm 
An alarm is generated based on the anomaly score or 
threshold assigned by the security manager. 
4.2 Supervised Approaches 
In this approach, a predictive model is developed based 
on a training dataset (i.e., data instances labeled as normal 
or attack class). Any unseen data instance is compared 
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against the model to determine which class it belongs to. 
There are two major issues that arise in supervised 
anomaly detection. First, the anomalous instances are far 
fewer in number compared to normal instances in the 
training data. Issues that arise due to imbalanced class 
distributions have been addressed in the data mining and 
machine learning literature [8]. Second, obtaining 
accurate and representative labels, especially for the 
anomaly class is usually challenging. A number of 
techniques have been proposed that inject artificial 
anomalies in a normal dataset to obtain a labeled training 
dataset [9]. Other than these two issues, the supervised 
anomaly detection problem is similar to building 
predictive models. We now discuss some of the most 
common incremental supervised anomaly detection 
approaches. 
 
1)  Yu et al. [28]: The authors propose an incremental 
learning method by cascading a service classifier (SC) 
over an incremental tree inducer (ITI) for supervised 
anomaly detection. A service classifier ensures that the 
ITI method is trained with instances with only one 
service value (e.g., ftp, smtp, telnet, etc.). The ITI 
method is trained with instances incrementally without 
the service attribute. The cascading method has three 
phases: (i) training, (ii) testing and (iii) incremental 
learning. During training phase, the service classifier 
method is first applied to partition the training dataset 
into m disjoint clusters according to different services. 
Then, the ITI method is trained with the instances in 
each cluster. The service classifier method ensures that 
each training instance is associated with only one 
cluster. In the testing  phase, it finds the clusters to 
which the test instances belong. Then, the ITI method 
is tested with the instances. In the incremental learning 
phase, the service classifier and ITI cascading method 
are not re-trained; the authors use incremental learning 
to train the existing ITI binary tree. Nearest Neighbor 
combination rules embedded within K-Means+ITI and 
SOM (Self-Organizing Map)+ITI cascading methods 
are used in experiments. The authors also compare the 
performance of SC+ITI with K-Means, SOM, ITI, K-
Means+ITI and SOM+ITI methods in terms of 
detection rate and false positive rate (FPR) on the 
KDD’99 dataset. Results show that the ITI method has 
better performance than K-Means, SOM, K-
Means+ITI and SOM+ITI methods in terms of overall 
detection rate. However, the SC+ITI cascading method 
outperforms the ITI method in terms of detection rate 
and FPR, and obtains better detection rate compared to 
other methods. Like the ITI method, SC+ITI also 
provide additional options for handling missing values 
and incremental learning. 
2)  Lascov et al. [29]: The authors focus on the design 
and analysis of efficient incremental SVM learning, 
with the aim of providing a fast, numerically stable 
and robust implementation. A detailed analysis of 
convergence and algorithmic complexity of 
incremental SVM learning is carried out in this paper. 
Based on this analysis, a new design for storage and 
for numerical operations is proposed. The design 
speeds up the training of an incremental SVM by a 
factor of 5 to 20. The performance of the new 
algorithm is demonstrated in two scenarios: learning 
with limited resources and active learning. The authors 
discuss various applications of the algorithm, such as 
in drug discovery, online monitoring of industrial 
devices and surveillance of network traffic. 
3)  Ren et al. [30]: The authors propose a new anomaly 
detection algorithm that can update the normal profile 
of system usage dynamically. The features used to 
model a system’s usage pattern are derived from 
program behavior. A new program behavior is inserted 
into old profiles by density-based incremental 
clustering when system usage pattern changes. It is 
much more efficient compared to traditional updating 
by re-clustering. The authors test their model using the 
1998 DARPA BSM audit data, and report that the 
normal profiles generated by their algorithm are less 
sensitive to noise data objects than profiles generated 
by the ADWICE algorithm. The method improves the 
quality of clusters and lowers the false alarm rate. 
4)  Khreich et al. [52]: The authors propose a system 
based on the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)  
to efficiently adapt ensembles of HMMs (EoHMMs) in 
response to new data, according to a learn-and-
combine approach. When a new block of training data 
becomes available, a pool of base HMMs is generated 
from the data using a different number of HMM states 
and random initializations. The responses from the 
newly-trained HMMs are combined to those of the 
previously-trained HMMs in ROC space using a novel 
incremental Boolean combination (incrBC) technique. 
Finally, specialized algorithms for model management 
allow selecting a diversified EoHMM from the pool, 
and adapting Boolean fusion functions and thresholds 
for improved performance, while it prunes redundant 
base HMMs. The proposed system is capable of 
changing the desired operating point during 
operations, and those points can be adjusted to changes 
in prior probabilities and costs of errors. The authors'   
simulations on synthetic and real-world host-based 
intrusion detection data indicate that the proposed 
system can achieve a significantly higher level of 
performance than when parameters of a single best 
HMM are estimated, at each learning stage, using 
reference batch and incremental learning techniques. It 
also outperforms the learn-and-combine approaches 
using static fusion functions (e.g., majority voting). 
Over time, the proposed ensemble selection algorithms 
form compact EoHMMs, while maintaining or 
improving system accuracy. Pruning allows limiting 
the pool size from increasing indefinitely, thereby 
reducing the storage space for accommodating HMM 
parameters without negatively affecting the overall 
EoHMM performance. Although applied for HMM-
based anomaly detection systems, their approach is 
general and can be employed for a wide range of 
classifiers and detection applications. 
5)  Lu et al. [53]: The authors use Commute Time 
Distance (CTD) as a metric for anomaly detection. It is 
a random walk based metric on graphs. They show that 
CTD can be used to simultaneously identify both 
global and local anomalies. They propose an accurate 
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and efficient approximation for computing CTD in an 
incremental fashion to facilitate real-time applications. 
They develop an online anomaly detection algorithm,  
where the CTD of each new arriving data point to any 
point in the current graph can be estimated in constant 
time ensuring a real-time response. 
6)  Yi et al. [56]: The authors develop RS-ISVM, an 
improved incremental SVM algorithm to deal with 
network intrusion detection. To reduce the noise 
generated by feature differences, the authors propose a 
modified kernel function U-RBF, with the mean and 
mean square difference values of feature attributes 
embedded in the RBF kernel function. Given the 
oscillation problem that usually occurs in traditional 
incremental SVM’s follow-up learning process, they 
present a reserved set strategy which can keep those 
samples that are more likely to be the support vectors 
in the computation process. Moreover, in order to 
shorten the training time, a concentric circle method is 
suggested to be used in selecting samples to form the 
reserved set. The authors claim that RS-ISVM can ease 
the oscillation phenomenon in the learning process and 
achieve good performance while its reliability remains 
relatively high. 
4.3 Semi-supervised Approaches 
In semi-supervised approach, the training data instances 
belong to the normal class only. Data instances are not 
labeled for the attack class. There are many approaches 
used to build the model for the class corresponding to 
normal behavior. This model is used to identify anomalies 
in the test data. Some of the detection methods are 
discussed in the following. 
 
1)  Burbeck et al. [31]: ADWICE (Anomaly Detection 
With fast Incremental Clustering) uses the first phase 
of the BIRCH clustering framework [32] to implement 
fast, scalable and adaptive anomaly detection. It 
extends the original clustering algorithm and applies 
the resulting detection mechanism for analysis of data 
from IP networks. The performance is demonstrated 
on the KDD99 intrusion dataset as well as on data 
from a test network at a telecom company. Their 
experiments show good detection quality (95%) and 
acceptable false positives rate (2.8 %) considering the 
online, real-time characteristics of the algorithm. The 
number of alarms is further reduced by application of 
the aggregation techniques implemented in the 
Safeguard architecture1. 
2)  Rasoulifard et al. [33]: It is important to increase the 
detection rate for known intrusions and also to detect 
unknown intrusions at the same time. It is also 
important to incrementally learn new unknown 
intrusions. Most current intrusion detection systems 
employ either misuse detection or anomaly detection. 
In order to employ these techniques effectively, the 
authors propose an incremental hybrid intrusion 
detection system. This framework combines 
incremental misuse detection and incremental anomaly 
detection. The framework can learn new classes of 
intrusion that do not exist in data used for training. The 
framework has low computational complexity, and so 
it is suitable for real-time or on-line learning. The 
authors use the KDDcup99 intrusion dataset to 
establish this method. 
3)  Kalle et al. [34]: Anomaly detection is very expensive 
in real-time. First, to deal with massive data volumes, 
one needs to have efficient data structures and 
indexing mechanisms. Second, the dynamic nature of 
today’s information networks makes the 
characterization of normal requests and services 
difficult. What is considered normal during some time 
interval may be classified as abnormal in a new 
context, and vice versa. These factors make many 
proposed data mining techniques less suitable for real-
time intrusion detection. The authors look at the 
shortcomings of ADWICE and propose a new grid 
index that improves detection performance while 
preserving efficiency in search. Moreover, they 
propose two mechanisms for adaptive evolution of the 
normality model: incremental extension with new 
elements of normal behavior, and a new feature that 
enables forgetting of outdated elements of normal 
behavior. It evaluates the technique for network-based 
intrusion detection using the KDD99 intrusion dataset 
as well as on data from a telecom IP test network. The 
experiments yield good detection quality and act as 
proof-of-concept for adaptation of normality. 
4.4 Unsupervised Approaches 
Unsupervised detection approaches do not require 
training data, and thus are most widely applicable. These 
techniques make the implicit assumption that normal 
instances are far more frequent than anomalies in the test 
data. If this assumption is not true, such techniques suffer 
from high false alarm. Most existing unsupervised 
anomaly detection approaches are clustering based. 
Clustering is a technique to group similar objects. It deals 
with finding structure in a collection of unlabeled data. 
Representing the data by fewer clusters necessarily leads 
to the loss of certain finer details, but achieves 
simplification. In anomaly detection, clustering plays a 
vital role in analyzing the data by identifying various 
groups as either belonging to normal or to anomalous 
categories. There are many different clustering based 
anomaly detection approaches in the literature. Most 
commonly used clustering techniques are: partitioning-
based (e.g., Zhong et al. [35]), hierarchical (e.g., Hsu et al. 
[36], Burbeck et al. [31], Kalle et al. [34]), density-based 
(e.g., Ren et al. [30]), and grid-based techniques. These 
techniques are discussed in the following in brief. 
 
1)  Hsu et al. [36]: Adaptive resonance theory network 
(ART) is a popular unsupervised neural network 
approach. Type I adaptive resonance theory network 
(ART1) deals with binary numerical data, whereas 
type II adaptive resonance theory network (ART2) 
deals with general numerical data. Several information 
systems collect mixed type attributes, which include 
numeric attributes and categorical attributes. However, 
both ART1 and ART2 do not deal with mixed type 
data. If the categorical attributes are transferred to 
binary data format, the binary data do not reflect 
reality with the same fidelity. It ultimately influences 
clustering quality. The authors present a modified 
adaptive resonance theory network (M-ART) and a 
1Safeguard: The safeguard project, (online) http://www.safeguardproject.info/ 
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conceptual hierarchy tree to solve the problem of 
clustering with mixed data. They show  that the M-
ART algorithm can process mixed type data well and 
has a positive effect on clustering. 
2)  Zhong et al. [35]: This paper presents an incremental 
clustering algorithm for intrusion detection using 
clonal selection based on a partitioning approach. It 
partitions the dataset into initial clusters by comparing 
the distance from data to cluster centroid with the size 
of cluster radius, and analyzes the clustering data with 
mixed attributes by using an improved definition of 
distance measure. The objective function optimizes 
clustering results by applying a clonal selection 
algorithm [37], and then labels clusters as normal or 
anomalous as appropriate. The authors try to find 
better cluster centroids to improve the partitioning 
quality which is evaluated by the objective function. If 
the value of objective function is small, the sum of the 
distances from data to the cluster centers is also small 
and the objects in the same cluster are more close to 
each other. The method attempts to optimize cluster 
results from one iteration to the next using the clonal 
selection algorithm [37]. The authors establish this 
incremental technique in terms of high detection rate 
and low false positive rate. 
4.5 Discussion 
Based on this short and selective survey of incremental 
techniques for anomaly detection, we make the following 
observations. 
 
•  Most incremental anomaly detection techniques have 
been benchmarked by using KDDcup99 intrusion 
dataset; hence, they cannot claim to be truly up-to-
date. It is an offline dataset. The KDDcup99 intrusion 
datasets have been already established to be biased 
considering the presence of normal and attack data in 
unrealistic proportions [22]. So, the approaches need 
to be tested over real time intrusion dataset. 
•  Performances of these techniques are not great in 
terms of detection rates. Of the existing techniques, 
ADWICE grid [34] has the highest detection rate, and 
Hybrid IDS [33] has the lowest detection rate as 
shown in Table 2. However, the techniques were 
tested with offline dataset only. 
•  Most techniques [36][35][31][34][30] use clustering 
for anomaly detection as shown in Table 1, although 
other techniques are also used. Clustering is popular 
because it is easy to create profiles based on the 
clusters. Most techniques use Euclidean distance as 
the proximity measure. The detection rates fairly 
high. 
• We observe that most techniques are non-real time 
and use distance or cluster based features for profile 
generation, though there are a few real time systems 
[29][31][34] as claimed by the authors. 
• We have identified pros and cons of each approach 
with performance in terms of detection rate and false 
positive rate these are seen in Table 2.  
4.6 Validity Measures 
The performance of any ANIDS is highly dependent 
upon (i) its individual configuration, (ii) the network it is 
monitoring and (iii) its position within that network [38]. 
Simply benchmarking an ANIDS once in a certain 
environment does not provide a definitive method for 
assessing it in a given situation. A number of metrics [38] 
are used to assess the suitability of a given ANIDS for a 
particular situation or environment. Some of these are 
discussed next. 
• Ability to identify attacks: The main performance 
requirement of an ANIDS is to detect intrusions. In 
particular, many vendors and researchers appear to 
consider any attempt to place malicious traffic on the 
network as an intrusion. In reality a more useful 
system will log malicious traffic and only inform the 
operator if the traffic poses a serious threat to the 
security of the target host. 
• Known vulnerabilities and attacks: All ANIDSs 
should be capable of detecting known vulnerabilities. 
However research indicates that many commercial 
IDSs fail to detect recently discovered attacks. On the 
other hand if a vulnerability or attack becomes 
known, all systems should be patched; otherwise, it 
should be applied so that the need for an ANIDS to 
detect these events is obviated. 
• Unknown attacks: Detecting unknown attacks must 
be the most important feature of any ANIDS. Only 
the ability of an ANIDS to detect attacks that are not 
yet known justifies expenses of its implementation 
and deployment. New vulnerabilities are being 
discovered every day and being able to detect known 
attacks is no longer enough.  
• Stability, Reliability and Security: An ANIDS should 
be able to continue operating consistently in all 
circumstances. The application and the operating 
system should ideally be capable of running for 
months, even years without segmentation faults or 
memory leakage. An important requirement imposed 
on an ANIDS is the ability to consistently report 
identical events in the same manner. The system 
should also be able to withstand attempts to 
compromise it. The ability of an attacker to identify 
an ANIDS on a network can be extremely valuable to 
the attacker. The attacker may then attempt to disable 
the ANIDS using DoS or DDoS techniques. The 
ANIDS system should be able to withstand all of 
these types of attack. 
• Identifying target and source: An alert raised after 
detecting an anomaly should also identify the source 
of the threat and the exact identity of the target 
system. Additional information from whois or DNS 
lookup on an IP address should also be obtained, if 
necessary. 
• Outcome of attack: Another useful feature of an 
ANIDS should be to determine the outcome of an 
attack (success or failure). In most cases, an alert 
simply indicates that an attempt to intrude has been 
made. It is then the responsibility of the analyst to 
search for correlated activities to determine the 
outcome of the attack. If an ANIDS were to present 
the analyst with a list of other alerts generated by the 
target host, and a summary of other (non-alert) traffic, 
the evaluation of the outcome can be greatly 
accelerated. 
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• Legality of data collected: The legality of the data 
collected by an ANIDS is of extreme importance if 
any legal activity may be pursued against the attacker. 
A disturbingly large number of systems do not collect 
the actual network packets; instead they simply 
record their own interpretation of events. A more 
robust system must capture and store network traffic 
in addition to simply raising the alert. 
• Signature updates: An ANIDS should have the ability 
to detect new types of intrusions and effectively 
update signatures dynamically. 
Table 1. General comparison of various incremental approaches for network anomaly detection  
Detection 
approaches 
 
Method 
Real (R)/ 
Non-real 
(N) Time 
Basic Idea Proximity 
Measure 
Clustering / 
SVM / 
DTree/ Hybrid 
Dataset 
used 
Data 
Type 
SC+ITI based 
[28] 
N cluster based 
service value 
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Decision Tree KDDCup99 Numeric 
SVM [29] R objective 
function 
- SVM KDDCup99 Numeric 
Density-based 
[30] 
N Distance, No. of 
points within r-
radius 
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Clustering DARPA98 
BSM 
Numeric 
EoHMMs [52] N HMMs Log likely-
hood function 
Hybrid UNM datasets Numeric 
RS-ISVM [56] N RBF based 
kernel function 
- SVM KDDcup99 Numeric 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervised 
 
iECT [53] 
R Laplacian matrix Compute time 
distance 
Hybrid DBLP, 
KDDcup99, and 
NICTA 
Numeric 
ADWICE TRD 
[31] 
R/N CF (cluster 
feature) tree 
Euclidean 
Distance 
Clustering KDDCup99 Numeric 
Hybrid IDS [33] N weighted 
majority voting 
Average 
Distance 
Hybrid DARPA98 Numeric 
 
 
 
Semi-supervised 
ADWICE Grid 
[34] 
R/N CF tree based 
index 
Euclidean 
Distance 
Clustering KDDCup99 Numeric 
 
M-ART [36] 
N distance-based 
tree 
LCP (least 
common 
points) 
Clustering UCI Mixed  
 
 
Unsupervised Clonal Selection 
[35] 
N distance Manhattan 
Distance 
Clustering KDDCup99 Mixed 
5. Evaluation Datasets 
Researchers use various datasets for testing and 
evaluating different anomaly detection methods. It is very 
difficult to evaluate an anomaly detection system based on 
live network traffic or any raw network traffic. That is 
why some benchmark datasets are used for evaluating an 
anomaly detection system. Some of these are discussed in 
brief. 
5.1 Lincoln Lab Datasets 
In 1998, MIT’s Lincoln Lab performed an evaluation of 
anomaly-based intrusion detection systems [39]. To 
perform this evaluation, the Lab generated the DARPA 
training and testing datasets. Both datasets contain attacks 
and background traffic. In 1999, the KDDCup 
competition used a subset of the preprocessed DARPA 
training and test data supplied by Solvo and Lee [40], the 
principal researchers for the DARPA evaluation. The raw 
training data was about four gigabytes of compressed 
binary tcpdump2 data from seven weeks of network 
traffic. This  
was processed into about five million connection records. 
The dataset is known as the KDD99 dataset and a 
summary of it is reported in Table 7 [41][42][43]. There 
are four main types of attacks: denial of service, remote-
to-local, user-to-root, and surveillance or probing. 
Background traffic is simulated and the attacks are all 
known. The training set, consisting of seven weeks of 
labeled data, is available to the developers of intrusion 
detection systems. The testing set also consists of 
simulated background traffic and known attacks, 
including some attacks that are not present in the training 
set. We discuss the four categories of attack patterns in 
details next. 
5.1.1 Denial of service attacks 
This class of attacks makes some computing or memory 
resource too busy or too full to handle legitimate requests. 
Thus legitimate users' access are denied. There are several 
ways to launch DoS attacks such as: by abusing the 
computers' legitimate features, by targeting the 
implementations bugs, by exploiting the system’s 
misconfigurations. It is classified based on the services 
that an attacker renders unavailable to legitimate users. 
Some of the popular DoS attacks with characteristics are 
shown in Table 3. 
5.1.2 Probing attacks 
Probing is a class of attacks, where an attacker scans a 
network to gather information or find known 
vulnerabilities or finds the weaknesses of the machines. 
An attacker tries to exploit the attacks, when weaknesses 
of one or more machines have been found. There are 
different types of probe attacks. Some of them abuse a 
computer’s legitimate features, some of them use social 
engineering techniques, and some of them use weaknesses 
2(online) http://www.tcpdump.org/ 
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of the machine. A set of probe attacks are shown in Table 
4. 
5.1.3 User to root attacks 
In user to root exploits, the attacker starts out with 
access to a normal user account on the system and is able 
to exploit vulnerability to gain root access to the system. 
Most common exploits in this class of attacks are regular 
buffer overflows, which are caused by regular 
programming mistakes and environment assumptions. 
Following are the list of user to root attacks (refer to 
Table 5). 
Table 2.  Pros and Cons of the methods 
 
Summary Performance  
Method 
 
Pros 
 
 
Cons 
Detection 
Rate (%) 
False 
Positive 
Rate (%) 
SC+ITI based 
[28] 
•  Performs well over force assignment problem 
and class dominance problem in terms of 
detection rate and false positive rate.  
• Performance comparison with other relevant 
techniques missing. 
• Not tested in a real-time environment.  
92.63 1.80 
SVM [29] •  Tested their approach in two possible 
scenarios: (i) learning with limited resources 
and (ii) active learning. They claim that it 
performs in constant running time during 
learning as well as prediction.  
• Too many input parameters.  - - 
Density-based 
[30] 
•  Reduces the cost of re-clustering and profile 
updating and claims to achieve higher accuracy 
than ADWICE.  
• In parameter level, it does not make any 
improvement.  
• Lack of performance results over larger 
datasets. 
- - 
 
EoHMMs [52] 
•  On synthetic and real-world HIDS datasets, 
achieves higher detection accuracy when single 
best HMM are estimated at each learning stage. 
• Not explored the dynamic selection of the 
best classifiers, decision threshold, Boolean 
fusion function during the operations.  
- - 
 
 
RS-ISVM [56] 
•  Reduces the training time as well as prediction 
time.  
•  Performs better than the simple SVM in terms 
of detection rate and false positive rate.  
• Performance is poor in case of U2R and R2L 
attacks. 
• It needs to reduce the number of parameters 
during training phase. 
89.17 4.9 
 
iECT [53] 
•  Capable to update the eigenvectors and 
eigenvalues of the graph Laplacian matrix 
incrementally.  
•  Capable to estimate CTD in constant time 
incrementally using the property of random 
walk and hitting time.  
• iECT is faster than iLED but it can only be 
used in case where a new test point is added 
and cannot be used when there are weigh 
updates in the graph. 
• They take only a small subset of datasets for 
testing.  
- - 
ADWICE 
TRD [31] 
•  Performs better on KDDcup99, DARPA98 and 
safeguard framework datasets.  
• ADWICE-TRD explores the BIRCH cluster 
features for tree formation but it is not 
feasible in network anomaly detection.  
95 2.8 
Hybrid IDS 
[33] 
•  Capable to detect unknown attacks i.e., the 
instance of attacks are not used in training. 
• They use only DARPA98 dataset. Hence, it 
needs to be tested over real-life network 
intrusion datasets.  
92.63 1.8 
ADWICE Grid 
[34] 
•  Performs better than ADWICE-TRD and 
ADWICE-TRR in terms of detection rate and 
false alarm rate on real world datasets in 
safeguard testbed.  
• They claim that their approach adaptively 
updates the normal profiles but it is 
important that the profiles need to be updated 
based on the different network scenarios. 
97.2 1.8 
 
M-ART [36] 
•  Can work well where both numeric and 
categorical data are available. 
•  Performs well in terms of detection rate on 
synthetic and real world UCI datasets. 
• Not tested on high dimensional large 
datasets. 
• Does not work well where it contains only in 
numeric data values. 
95 2.8 
Clonal 
Selection [35] 
•  Capable to work in mixed type datasets based 
their modified objective function. 
•  Performs well in terms of detection rate and 
false positive rate. 
• May not work well in real-time scenarios. 98.3 1.8 
5.1.4 Remote to local attacks 
A remote to local (R2L) attack makes attack by sending 
packets to a machine over a network, and then exploits the 
machines vulnerability to illegally gain local access as a 
user. There are different types of R2U attacks. The most 
common attack in this class uses social engineering. Some 
R2L attacks are reported in Table 6. 
5.2 LBNL Datasets 
This dataset can be obtained from Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory (LBNL) in the USA. Traffic in this 
dataset is comprised of packet-level incoming, outgoing, 
and internally routed traffic streams at the LBNL edge 
routers. Traffic was anonymized using the tcpmkpub tool 
[44]. The main applications observed in internal and 
external traffic are Web (i.e., HTTP), Email, and Name 
Services. The dataset identify attack traffic by isolating 
the corresponding scans in aggregate traffic traces. The 
outgoing TCP scans in the dataset follow LBNL hosts for 
resetting the TCP connection. Clearly, the attack rate is 
significantly lower than the background traffic rate (see 
Table 8 for detailed statistics). 
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5.3 Endpoint Datasets 
The traffic rates observed at the end-points are much 
lower than those at the LBNL routers. The large traffic 
volumes of home computers are also evident from their 
high mean numbers of sessions per second. To generate 
attack traffic, the analysts infected VMs on the end-points 
with different malwares: Zotob.G, Forbot-FU, Sdbot-
AFR, Dloader-NY, So-Big.E@mm, My-Doom.A@mm, 
Blaster, Rbot-AQJ, and RBOT.CCC. Details of the 
malwares can be found at Semantic Security Response 
website3. The attack traffic logged at the end-points is 
mostly comprised of outgoing port scans. Moreover, the 
attack traffic rates at the end-points are generally much 
higher than the background traffic rates of LBNL datasets. 
For each malware, attack traffic of 15 minutes duration 
was inserted in the background traffic at each end-point at 
a random time instance. The background and attack traffic 
statistics of the end-point datasets [45] are given in Table 
9 and Table 10. 
 
Table 3. DoS attacks and its characteristics 
Attack type  Service  Mechan
ism 
Effect of the attack 
Apache2  http  Abuse  Crashes httpd 
Back  http  
 
Abuse/ 
Bug  
Slows down server response 
Land  http  
 
Bug  Freezes the machine 
Mail bomb  N/A  Abuse  
 
Annoyance 
SYN flood  TCP  Abuse  Denies service on one or more 
ports 
Ping of 
death  
ICMP  Bug  
 
None 
Process 
table  
TCP  
 
Abuse  Denies new processes 
Smurf  ICMP  
 
Abuse  Slows down network 
Syslogd  Syslog  Bug  
 
Kills the Syslogd 
Teardrop  N/A  
 
Bug  Reboots the machine 
Udpstorm  Echo/ 
Chargen  
Abuse  Slows down the network 
 
Table 4. Probe attacks and its characteristics 
Attack 
type 
Service Mechanism Effect of the attack 
Ipsweep ICMP 
 
Abuse of 
feature 
Identifies active machines 
Mscan Many 
 
Abuse of 
feature 
Looks for known 
vulnerabilities 
Nmap 
 
Many Abuse of 
feature 
Identifies active ports on a 
machine 
Saint 
 
Many Abuse of 
feature 
Looks for known 
vulnerabilities 
Satan Many Abuse of 
feature 
Looks for known 
vulnerabilities 
 
Table 5. User to root attacks and its characteristics 
Attack type  Service  Mechanism Effect of the 
attack 
Eject User session Buffer overflow Gains root shell 
Ffbconfig User session Buffer overflow Gains root shell 
Fdformat User session Buffer overflow Gains root shell 
Loadmodule User session Poor environment 
sanitation 
Gains root shell 
Perl User  session Poor environment 
sanitation 
Gains root shell 
Ps User session Poor temp file 
management 
Gains root shell 
Xterm User session Buffer overflow Gains root shell 
 
Table 6. Remote to local attacks and its characteristics 
Attack 
type  
Service  Mechanism Effect of the attack 
Dictionary 
 
Telnet, 
rlogin, pop, 
ftp, imap 
Abuse 
feature 
 
Gains user access 
Ftp-write FTP Misconfig Gains user access 
Guest Telnet, 
rlogin 
Misconfig Gains users access 
 
Imap Imap Bug Gains root access 
Named 
 
DNS Bug Gains root access 
Phf Http Bug Executes commands as http 
user 
Sendmail SMTP Bug Executes commands as root 
Xlock SMTP Misconfig 
 
Spoof user to obtain 
password 
Xsnoop SMTP Misconfig Monitor key stokes 
remotely 
5.4 Network Trace Datasets 
Network traces [46] captured from live networks is often 
used for testing intrusion detection systems. The main 
advantage of using network traces is that the results do not 
demonstrate any bias due to artifacts from simulated data 
that are not representative of actual data. However, when 
network traces are available, they are often limited. For 
example, the traces might only contain packet header data, 
or might be summarized even further into flow-level 
information. 
5.5 NetFlow Datasets 
NetFlow is used to perform traffic analysis. NetFlow 
data is aggregated flow level data captured at the router 
level in online mode. The use of NetFlow data for high-
speed traffic analysis is quite important and needed to 
detect attacks or anomalies from high speed network [47].  
However, the use of NetFlow comes at the cost that the 
packets have been stripped of their content. As Sir Francis 
Bacon once said: "Knowledge is power" [48]. With this 
loss of the packet content, some attacks will be impossible 
to find, because in those cases only the packet content 
contains relevant information. Still, there is ample scope 
for detecting attacks or anomalies in high speed network. 
Flows are identified uniquely by characteristics of the 
traffic that they represent, including the source and 
destination IP (Internet Protocol) address, IP type, source 
and destination TCP or UDP (user datagram protocol) 
ports, type of service and a few other items [47]. NetFlow 
records are sent to the logging host in the following cases. 
• For flow representing TCP traffic, when the 
connection is completed (after a RST or FIN is seen). 
• When no traffic for the flow has been seen in 15 
seconds. 
• 30 minutes after the start of the flow. This causes 
long lasting traffic patterns to show up sooner than 
they might otherwise in the log. 
• When the flow table fills and meets conditions. 
 
 
3http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter 
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Table 7. Normal and attack traffic information for KDD99 dataset 
 
 
Table 8. Background and attack traffic information for 
the LBNL datasets 
Date Durati
-on 
(mins) 
LBNL 
Hosts 
Remote 
Hosts 
Backgro
und 
Traffic 
rate 
(packet/
sec) 
Attack 
Traffic rate 
(packet/sec) 
10/04/04  10 min 4,767 4,342 8.47 0.41 
12/15/04  60 min 5,761 10,478 3.5 0.061 
12/16/04   60 min 5,210 7,138 243.83 72 
 
Table 9. Background traffic information for four 
Endpoints with high and low rates 
Endpoint 
ID 
Endpoint 
Type 
Duration 
(months) 
 
Total 
Sessions 
Mean 
Session 
Rate 
(/sec) 
3 Home 3 3,73,009 1.92 
4 Home 2 4,44,345 5.28 
6 University 9 60,979 0.19 
10 University 13 1,52,048 0.21 
 
Table 10. Endpoint attack traffic for two high and two low 
rate worms  
Malware 
 
Release 
Date 
Avg. Scan rate 
(/sec) 
Port (s) Used 
Dloader-NY Jul 2005 46.84 sps TCP 1,35,139 
Forbot-FU Sept 2005 32.53 sps TCP 445 
Rbot-AQJ Oct 2005 0.68 sps TCP 1,39,769 
MyDoom-A Jan 2006 0.14 sps TCP 3127-3198 
5.6 Discussion 
Based on our survey of existing incremental anomaly 
detection techniques in the context of preprocessed or 
real-life datasets, we observe the following-  
 
•  Of the five datasets reported above, most researchers 
have established their work using either the Lincoln 
Lab dataset in offline mode or using the network 
trace or netflow dataset generated based on their 
own testbed in online mode. 
•  Most datasets are useful for offline anomaly 
detection. 
•  Some existing datasets are not labeled (e.g., LBNL, 
Network trace) and do not have any attack statistics 
(e.g., LBNL, Network trace). 
•  There is both packet and flow level information in 
the network trace dataset. 
 
DoS Probe u2r r2l Dataset 
Total 
instances 
Attacks Total 
instances 
Attacks Total 
instances 
Attacks Total 
instances 
Attacks 
Normal 
 
10% KDD 
391458 4107 52 1126 97277 
Corrected 
KDD 
229853 4107 52 1126 97277 
Whole 
KDD 
229853 
apache2 
smurf,  
neptune, 
back, 
teardrop, 
pod, 
land, 
mailbomb, syn 
flood, ping of 
death, 
syslogd, 
process table  
udpstorm 
4107 
satan, 
ipsweep, 
portsweep, 
nmap, 
mscan, saint 
      52 
buffer 
overflow, 
rootkit, 
loadmodule, 
perl, ps, 
xterm, eject, 
ffbconfig, 
fdformat 
 
1126 
warezclient, 
guess 
passwd, 
warezmaster, 
imap, ftp 
write, 
multihop, 
phf, spy, 
named, 
sendmail, 
xlock, 
xsnoop 
97277 
We present a comparison (refer to Table 11) of the 
existing datasets in terms of different parameters, such as 
that attack information, and traffic information in terms of 
normal or attack. 
6. Evaluation Criteria and Analysis 
Benchmark intrusion datasets play an important role in 
evaluating an attack detection system. But there is only 
one well known and commonly available benchmark 
dataset (i.e., KDDCup99) for performance analysis of 
IDSs. Researchers analyze their detection methods based 
on live network traffic (i.e., network trace); but they 
cannot claim that the detection methods work in all 
situations. Some evaluation criteria are discussed below in 
brief. 
6.1 Metrics 
The intrusion detection community commonly uses four 
metrics. The first two are detection rate and false positive 
rate and, conversely, true and false negative rates [49]. 
Two other metrics, effectiveness and efficiency are 
defined by Staniford et al. [50]. Effectiveness is defined 
as the ratio of detected scans (i.e., true positives) to all 
scans (true positives plus false negatives). Similarly, 
efficiency is defined as the ratio of the number of 
identified scans (i.e., true positives) to all cases flagged as 
scan (true positives plus false positives) [50], and is the 
same as the detection rate defined previously. 
 
Table 11. Comparison among intrusion datasets 
Name of 
the 
dataset 
Categories 
of attacks 
 
Benchmark 
(B)/Non-
benchmark 
(N) 
Traffic type 
(normal[N]/
attack[A]) 
Real/ 
Non-real 
time 
KDDCup99 DoS, Probe, 
u2r, r2l 
B Both  N 
LBNL - B Both N 
End-point Zotob.G, 
Forbot- 
FU, Sdbot-
AFR, 
Dloader-NY, 
So-
Big.E@mm, 
MyDoom.A
@mm, 
Blaster, 
N Both N 
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Rbot-AQJ, 
RBOT.CCC 
Network 
Traces 
- N N/A R 
NetFlow - N N/A R 
6.2 ROC Analysis  
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve is often 
used to evaluate the performance of a particular detector. 
This approach is used by Lincoln Lab for evaluation of 
anomaly-based detection systems and discussed in detail 
by McHugh [51]. An ROC curve has false positive rate on 
its x-axis and true positive rate on its y-axis, thus moving 
from (0, 0) at the origin to (1, 1). The detection system 
must return a likelihood score between 0 and 1, when it 
detects an intrusion in order for the ROC curve to provide 
meaningful results. The ROC curve can be used to 
determine how well the overall system performs, the most 
appropriate threshold values given acceptable true and 
false positive rates, and to compare different detection 
systems. 
6.3 Complexity and Delay Comparison 
The training and classification time taken by anomaly 
detectors as well as their training and run-time memory 
requirements can be computed using the hprof tool [45]. 
Contrary to common intuition, complexity does not 
translate directly into accuracy of an anomaly detector. A 
delay value of ∞ is listed if an attack is not detected 
altogether. The detection delay is reasonable (less than 1 
second) for all the anomaly detectors we surveyed.  
Based on our survey, we observe that most researchers 
use the first evaluation metric i.e., detection rate, false 
positive rate, effectiveness, and efficiency to establish 
their works. 
7. Research Issues and Challenges 
Based on our survey of published papers on 
incremental anomaly detectors, we observe that most 
techniques have been validated using the KDD99 
intrusion datasets in an offline mode. However, the 
effectiveness of an ANIDS based on incremental 
approach can only be judged in a real-time environment. 
Following are some of the research issues we have 
identified in this area. 
 
•  Most existing IDSs have been found inadequate 
with new networking paradigms currently used for 
both wired and wireless communication4,5. Thus, 
adaptation to new network paradigms needs to be 
explored. 
•  Most existing methods are dependent on multiple 
input parameters. Improper estimation of these 
parameters leads to high false alarm rates. 
•  The clustering techniques that are used by anomaly 
detectors need to be faster and scalable when used 
on high dimensional and voluminous mixed type 
data. 
•  Lack of labeled datasets for training or validation is 
a crucial issue that needs to be addressed. The 
KDD99 datasets are out-of-date. New valid datasets 
need to be created and made available to researchers 
and practitioners. Developing a reasonably 
exhaustive dataset for training or validation for use 
in supervised or semi-supervised anomaly detection 
approaches is a challenging task. 
•  Estimation of unbiased anomaly scores for periodic, 
random or bursty attack scenarios is another 
challenging issue. 
•  Lack of standard labeling strategies is a major 
bottleneck in the accurate recognition of normal as 
well as attack clusters. 
•  Development of pre or post-processing mechanisms 
for false alarm minimization is necessary. 
•  Handling of changing traffic pattern remains a 
formidable problem to address. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the state of modern 
incremental anomaly detection approaches in the context 
of computer network traffic. The discussion follows two 
well-known criteria for categorizing of anomaly detection: 
detection strategy and data source. Most anomaly 
detection approaches have been evaluated using Lincoln 
Lab (i.e. KDDCup99 intrusion dataset), Network Traces 
and LBNL datasets. Experiments have demonstrated that 
for different types of attacks, some anomaly detection 
approaches are more successful than others. Therefore, 
ample scope exists for working toward solutions that 
maintain high detection rates while lowering false alarm 
rates. Incremental learning approaches that combine data 
mining, neural network and threshold based analysis for 
the anomaly detection have shown great promise in this 
area. 
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